We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the …rst stage …rms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the …rms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the …rst stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.
Introduction
While the theory of price discrimination is well understood in the monopoly setting, this literature is relatively new for imperfectly competitive markets. There are two broad approaches to modelling imperfect competition: price competition and quantity competition. The di¤erentiated products framework is dominant in the price competition setting and the homogeneous goods framework is dominant in the quantity competition setting. 1 The common approach in the literature on price discrimination in oligopoly follows the price competition approach. Borenstein [3] , Chen [4] , Holmes [8] , 2 and Thisse and Vives [21] exemplify some of the studies that use the price competition approach.
In the present paper we concentrate on the homogeneous goods framework where the valuations of customers are represented by a function of some characteristic(s) of the customers. On the basis of those characteristics …rms segment the customers in various segments. We analyze price discrimination as a twostage game. In the …rst stage the …rms compete on quantities that they put in the market, and in the second stage they simultaneously decide what fraction of the quantity they sell to di¤erent groups of buyers. 3 In other words, in the second stage …rms optimally segment their customers by allocating the available quantities. Hence, in the second stage the …rms can be asymmetric if their …rst stage choices are not the same. Firms may have many instruments at their disposal for discriminating between buyers. Where our model can be applied, the examples abound. A prominent example of an instrument used for price discrimination is the airline industry, where the valuations of buyers can be represented by a function of the time when they buy tickets. Business travellers, whose plans are generally last moment, are willing to pay more compared to tourists, whose plans are almost always ‡exible. Thus di¤erent segments of buyers can be grouped according to the day they want to buy a particular airline seat. For example, higher-end segments may consist of business travellers. In order to …x ideas we stick to the airline industry.
The paper closest to ours that considers price discrimination in quantity competition is Hazledine [6] . For the linear demand case, Hazledine [6] analyzes price discrimination in the Cournot framework, where …rms decide on quantities to sell in various segments. In contrast to Hazledine [6] , who models price discrimination in one stage, we model price discrimination in two stages, as described earlier. In both Hazledine [6] and our model, the number of segments is exogenous. Hazledine [6] …nds that the average price in the market is independent of the level of price discrimination and thus concludes that the standard single-price models' prediction is not misleading in terms of the average price. Bakó and Kálecz-Simon [2] and Kutlu [11] con…rm the robustness of invariance of average price to the level of price discrimination. For the linear demand case, Kutlu [10] incorporates price discrimination in the Stackelberg [18] model and …nds that the leader does not price discriminate. All these models consider that the …rms segment customers into di¤erent segments according to certain characteristics determining their valuation. Varian [23] provides an earlier example of the similar approach for price discrimination in monopoly. In quantity setting price discrimination for a monopoly Varian [23] …nds that increase in output is necessary for price discrimination to be welfare increasing. Formby and Millner [5] consider the relationship between price discrimination and competition. 4 More precisely, they compare the social welfare of price discriminating monopoly (in Hazledine's [6] framework) and that of single price Cournot competition. They …nd that when the demand curve 5 is concave (convex, linear), price discrimination with n prices produces greater (lesser, equal) output and welfare than a Cournot oligopoly with n competitors.
We consider a general demand function (not restricted to linear) for the homogeneous goods in a duopoly setting. We start with the second stage of the game where, for a given quantity from the …rst stage, we provide an algorithm to …nd the shares to be allocated in di¤erent segments. One of the …ndings of our paper is that in the second stage both …rms are active in the higher-end segments and their allocation of quantities are the same for each higher-end segment until the smaller …rm runs out its …rst-stage quantity. Unless the demand function is "too convex," the shares of the higher-end segments are greater than those of the lower-end ones. Then, we analyze the …rst stage of the competition where …rms choose quantities. We provide an explicit solution for linear demand as an illustration. We show …rms' behavior in the benchmark Cournot case. The total quantities sold by the Cournot oligopolist and total welfare increase with the level of price discrimination. We …nd that the deadweight loss always exists, no matter what the level of price discrimination is. This contrasts with the one-stage price discrimination game (Hazledine [6] ) and monopoly. In both the one-stage game and monopoly, deadweight loss vanishes as the number of price segments grows. Therefore, our model serves as an example of the fact that competition may not always be welfare increasing. Indeed, in this case, allowing a monopolist to operate and redistributing an optimal tax collected from the monopolist could make everyone better o¤ compared to the two-stage price discriminating duopoly.
In particular, an antitrust authority valuing total welfare may have higher incen- 4 Formby and Millner [5] call it Stackelberg price discrimination. 5 Whenever we mention "demand curve" we mean "inverse demand curve." tives to approve mergers for duopolists in the airline industry compared to other industries where price discrimination is not practiced. That is, the required e¢ -ciency gain for welfare in the price discrimination framework is potentially lower. 6 Moreover, in contrast to the established results in the literature that we discussed above, we …nd that the average price is increasing with the level of price discrimination. Hence, the standard single-price models' prediction about the average price can potentially be misleading when …rms …rst choose capacities and then allocate these capacities in a second stage. Therefore, caution should be taken when using the average price for estimation in empirical models.
In section 2, we introduce our model and present results for the share allocation for a general demand function. In section 3, we provide the solution of the share allocation game for the linear demand case. We also provide an extension of the Cournot game and compare our results with that of Hazledine [6] . Section 5 concludes, and we gather the major proofs in section 6 (Appendix).
The Model and Share Allocations
In this section we consider an oligopolistic competition model in which …rms choose the sizes of segments optimally. 7 We provide a solution algorithm for a general demand function which we use when deriving our results for the linear demand case in the following sections. We rule out the arbitrage possibilities, including intra-personal arbitrage, where a high-valuation customer can act like a low-valuation customer. Hence, in this sense, our model is a version of third-degree price discrimination (group pricing). The price in a segment is determined through the quantity choices of …rms and depends on how much is sold in other segments.
For example, consider a market with two segments based on the reservation prices, which depend on the number of days before the ‡ight where there is a breakdown in prices. Airlines can choose quantities assigned to each segment indirectly by choosing a threshold day so that the customers arriving later than this day are assigned to segment 1 and the remaining customers are assigned to segment 2. By changing the threshold day, the airline can implicitly decrease the size of segment 6 Note, however, that such a redistribution can be di¢ cult to implement in practice. Also, merger decisions would likely be based on a variety of factors, including but not limited to …rms' price discrimination behaviors. Here, we point out that the presence of price discrimination may not necessarily lead to welfare-decreasing outcomes. 7 Note that the number of segments is exogenous. By optimal segmentation we mean the distribution of quantities in various segments rather than the number of segments, which is exogenous in our model.
1.
Hence, whenever such adjustments are di¢ cult or impossible to implement, the model with exogenous segmentation discussed above seems more sensible. For example, if the segmentation is based on gender, the size of segments would be taken as given. On the other hand, if the airlines are ‡exible in such adjustments, then our model may be more sensible. It seems that price discrimination based on advance purchase segmentation as described above allows the airlines to be ‡exible in adjusting the size of segments and thus our model …ts this framework well. Now we describe our theoretical model which is based on Hazledine [6] . Assume for simplicity that there are only two …rms in the market that sell a homoge- ; s K B ) with
Going back to our example of airline seats o¤ered for a speci…c route, from now on we can think of the product "an airline seat" and a seller "an airline." Total number of seats of airlines is exogenously given. The airlines simultaneously decide how many of these seats they sell to which customers. The price of the good for the k th segment is given by:
where q i A and q i B are the quantities sold in segment i by A and B;
is the total quantity sold in all segments from 1 to k; and P is a twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing demand function that represents consumers' valuations. 8 Moreover, for a given combination of Q A and Q B , we assume that the revenue functions (which are also the pro…t functions in our case, given zero costs) of …rms A and B are strictly concave in s A and s B , respectively. 9 The optimization problem of …rm A is given by: 10 Now we provide a proposition that describes the behavior of the …rms in all segments for a general demand function. Even though we do not have a closedform solution, this proposition gives a recursive way to get an explicit solution for a speci…c demand function up to …nding{. After the proposition we describe an 9 The demand curve not being too convex is one of the requirements. Notice for example, in the monopoly case with no price discrimination we require the inverse demand function to be "less convex" than P (Q) = 1 Q . See Novshek [13] , Roberts and Sonnenschein [16] , Szidarowsky and Yakowitz [20] , Tirole [22] , and Vives [24] for conditions on existence in setups without price discrimination.
10 Note that the optimization problem for …rm B is exactly the same.
algorithm to …nd such a solution. Later in this paper, in Corollaries 1, 2, and 3, we give an explicit solution for the linear demand case as an example.
Proposition 1
Assume that Q A Q B . Let{ 2 f2; 3; :::; K; K + 1g be such that s{ A = s{ Algorithm 1 Given the value of{, the algorithm provides the quantity allocations for each segment. Recall that A may not be active for some of the segments.
Hence, the algorithm requires a case analysis. There are three cases to consider.
Case I considers the segments where both A and B are fully active so that A matches the quantity of B. Case II considers the segment where both A and B are active but where the capacity of A is not large enough to match the quantity of B for that particular segment. Finally, Case III considers the segments where only B is active. Based on these cases, the solution algorithm is given as follows. 
Note that depending on the value of{ some of the cases disappear. Hence, the sequence of shares might start from Case II or Case III rather than Case I.
Whenever{ > 3 the solution algorithm starts from Case I; if{ = 3, the solution algorithm starts from Case II; and if{ = 2, the solution algorithm starts from Case III.
Case I (j <{ 2):
11 Note that this statement holds for the{ > 2 case. The case where{ = 2 is trivial as s
Case II (j ={ 2):
Case III (j >{ 2):
In Proposition 1 we described the conditions for equilibrium shares for a general demand function. One particular implication of this proposition is that unless the demand function is "too convex," the shares of the higher-end segments are greater than those of the lower-end ones. In the following proposition, we give more conditions that will help identify{. The …rst statement of the proposition along with Lemma 1 shows that there is no segment where the smaller …rm puts more quantity than the bigger …rm.
Proposition 2 The shares of …rms in the last segment where A is active, i.e., the segment{ 1, must satisfy:
At this point we would like to mention that the shares that are decided by the above results are invariant to any a¢ ne transformation of the demand function.
In other words, two demand functions P andP whereP = + P would lead to the same solution for the shares. In what follows we solve the linear demand case. For a general demand function the equilibrium can be calculated in a similar fashion.
The Linear Demand Case
In this section we present our main results for the linear demand case. We consider the linear demand given by P j = a Q j . Using the propositions stated above we …nd the closed-form solution for the equilibrium, which turns out to be unique. 12 In line with the previous section, in the equilibrium both …rms are active in the top segment(s) and the bigger …rm is active in all K segments. The …rms match the quantities in the top segments until segment{ 2. Also, in each segment until segment{ 2, the …rms put exactly half of the quantity that they put in the previous segment. Starting from segment{ 1 the bigger …rm splits the quantity equally in all segments. Recall that this behavior of the bigger …rm is like that of a monopolist in those segments. 
The optimal shares for A and B are described as follows:
Case 1 ({ = 2): 
12 Note that any linear inverse demand function will lead to exactly the same solution as we have mentioned earlier.
The following corollary states the behavior of …rm A in the last segment(s).
In segment{ 1 it just puts the remainder, which is no more than half of what he puts in segment{ 2.
Corollary 2 For any{ = 3; :::; K + 1 we have:
The following corollary, together with Corollary 1, characterizes the solution for general{ 2 . For a given Q A =Q B ratio,{ is unique and so is the equilibrium.
When the gap between capacities of …rms increases (i.e., Q A =Q B decreases), the number of segments where the …rm with smaller capacity is active (i.e.,{ 1)
would decrease. The …rm with smaller capacity would concentrate on the highend segments. The reason is that the …rm with smaller capacity would have a higher shadow cost compared to the other …rm, which makes it relatively harder for it to stay in the low-end segments.
Corollary 3
The shares for the …rst segments are given as follows:
where the unique{ is characterized by:
Now that we have identi…ed the unique equilibrium of the share allocation game with exogenously given capacities, we explore the equilibria in the games where the capacities themselves are endogenous.
In this section we provide a generalization of the benchmark Cournot competition model and compare it with Hazledine's [6] price discrimination model. For both settings we assume that there are two …rms in the market and the marginal costs are equal to zero. The …rms divide the consumers into K segments according to their reservation prices. The demand is assumed to be linear and given by Equation (13) . We set a = 1. In Hazledine's [6] framework the …rms are playing a one-stage game in which they simultaneously choose the quantities that they assign to each segment. By contrast, the second stage of our two-stage framework corresponds to the share allocation game introduced in the previous section.
A crucial di¤erence in solving the two models is that the pro…t function of each …rm in the …rst stage of our two-stage model is a piecewise function. Each piece corresponds to a di¤erent{, which in turn is determined by the ratio of …rst stage quantities,
. A di¢ culty in …nding the best response functions of the …rms is that the calculations must take into account the various cases corresponding to various{'s. However, for …nding the symmetric equilibrium we only need to consider the piece corresponding to{ = K + 1. For the two …rms and two prices (segments) case, we …nd that the equilibrium quantities of each …rm is 9=23, in contrast with Hazledine's [6] corresponding quantity, 3=7. The average price 13 and pro…ts respectively are 9=23 and 81=529, as opposed to 1=3 and 1=7 in Hazledine's [6] framework. For K = 1; 2; :::; 15 we plot the pro…ts, quantities, and average prices for comparison. Figures 1-4 compare the symmetric equilibrium outcomes of our two-stage game, the equilibrium outcomes of Hazledine [6] , and the equilibrium outcomes of price discriminating monopoly. From now on, we denote our model by "KK," Hazledine's [6] by "H," and monopoly by "M."
13 By average price we mean output-weighted average price. In general, the pro…ts of A and B are given by:
The portion of the best response capacity of …rm A and B corresponding thê
Therefore, in the symmetric equilibrium the pro…t, quantity, and average price are given by: 14
14 We don't provide the relevant values for B as they would be the same.
In the limit when K ! 1 the equilibrium values become A = . Hence, in the presence of competition even if the …rms can charge many prices there is deadweight loss. This contrasts with both Hazledine [6] and the price discriminating monopoly case where for large K there is no deadweight loss. A monopolist can set quantities without being distracted by the e¤ects of competition. However, in the price discrimination framework, depending on the setting (Hazledine [6] versus capacity choice price discrimination game (KK)), competition can have a negative e¤ect on total welfare. Hazledine [7] argues that Air New Zealand and Qantas use K = 12. If other airlines use a similar number of segments and play KK, then an antitrust authority valuing the total welfare might have higher incentives to approve mergers in the airline industry compared to industries without price discrimination. Hence, the required e¢ ciency gain for such a merger is potentially lower. If the antitrust authority ignores this, then this might lead to an over-rejection of mergers. KK dominates its one-stage counterpart in terms of pro…ts. Conditional on the second stage outcomes, the …rms can coordinate their capacities (total quantities) better compared with Hazledine's [6] counterpart. This results in lower quantities and higher pro…ts for the …rms.
One implication of this is that …rms can potentially bene…t from the presence of capacity constraints. In Hazledine's [6] setting the average price is invariant to the number of segments, K. This invariance result is shown to be robust to other settings. For example, Bakó and Kálecz-Simon [2] show the invariance result for the asymmetric cost case and Kutlu [11] shows the invariance result for a functional form which is nesting constant elasticity demand function. However, in our capacity choice framework this invariance result breaks down.
Conclusion
We studied the price discrimination and imperfect competition in a homogeneous goods framework. We modelled this as a two-stage game as opposed to the existing works in this particular framework. One of our main …ndings is that deadweight loss exists for all levels of price discrimination. Hence, if the number of price segments is large, the monopoly may be socially preferred over a duopoly. This contrasts with the price discriminating monopolist and one-stage price discriminating duopoly. Therefore, a welfarist social planner should consider protecting monopolies or approving mergers when evidence of two stage price discrimination is found. Another …nding is that the output-weighted average price will increase as the level of price discrimination increases. This contrasts with the earlier …ndings that suggest that output-weighted average price is invariant to the level of price discrimination and this invariance is robust. Thus it has been suggested that the average price can be used for estimation purposes without worrying about price discrimination. Our result changes this perception and indicates that caution must be taken if there is evidence of price discrimination.
A generalization of our model to the many …rms case can also be used in merger analysis in the price discrimination framework where merging is a way to expand the capacities of …rms. Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds [17] show that, in general, without a form of cost reduction the mergers are not pro…table in the Cournot framework. One way to deal with this problem is to allow capacity expansions ex-post the merger. Of course, in practice the merger analysis is more complicated than this. A better model for analyzing the e¤ects of mergers would also incorporate other factors, such as the dynamic factors and e¢ ciency. 15 6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (2) is given by:
. 16 For any i = 1; 2; :::; K the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given 15 See Kutlu and Sickles [12] for a dynamic model considering the e¢ ciencies of …rms when measuring their market powers. 16 Note that we are solving the problem of an active …rm. Therefore it is assumed that QA > 0.
by: 17
In what follows we assume that
for the sake of notational simplicity. Now, we prove the statement 1 of Lemma 1. Let us assume, to get a contradiction, that s i A = 0 and s i+1 A > 0 for some i 2 f1; 2; :::; K 1g. Then we have:
Here the inequality comes from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions; the …rst equality follows from our assumption that s i A = 0; the second equality follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions given that s i+1 A > 0. Hence, P i P i+1 . But by the monotonicity of the demand P i P i+1 , implying that P i = P i+1 . This in turn implies that there are K 1 segments, which is a contradiction. Now, we prove the statement 2 of Lemma 1. Let{ 2 f2; :::; K; K + 1g be such that s{ A = s{ 
17 For notational simplicity we represent
Subtracting the equality (18) from the inequality (19) gives:
From (16) and (17) we know that:
Therefore, we have:
From equations (20) and (21), we have:
. . .
From monotonicity of demand, we have @P j @Q < 0. Therefore:
Summing over segments 1; 2; :::; t 1 we get:
The strict inequality follows from the fact that A is active in all segments until segment K. This is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove statement 3 of Lemma 1. Note that by statement 2 of Lemma 1 we have s j B > 0 for j 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg. Hence, for all j <{ we have
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that for j <{ 1 we have:
Also, by statement 2 of Lemma 1, using the similar steps as above, we get:
For Case I, we have j <{ 2.
For Case II, we have j ={ 2.
For Case III, notice that Q A is exhausted after segment{ 1. For segment
A is the residual share for A. By statement 2 of Lemma 1, B is active in segments{;{ + 1; :::; K, i.e., s{ B ; s{ +1 B ; :::; s K B > 0. Therefore from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all j ={;{ + 1; :::; K 1 we have:
Hence, we have:
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we prove the inequality (11) . From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that:
Then we have:
Hence:
By monotonicity of the demand we know that @P{ 1 @Q < 0. Therefore we have:
Now, we prove the inequality (12) . From Proposition 1 we know that:
B by monotonicity of the demand we have:
Therefore:
Proof of Corollary 1
For Case 1, note that by de…nition of{ and statement 2 of Lemma 1 we have
From Equation (9) and Equation (10) we have:
This implies that:
For Case 2, we only prove the{ > 3 case. The{ = 3 is case is similar. For j <{ 1, by Equation (3) and Equation (4), for any j <{ 2 we have:
By Equation (22) and the fact that s{
A . Now, we …nd s{ This implies that:
The case j >{ 1 directly follows from equations (7), (9), and (23).
Proof of Corollary 2
By Proposition 2 we know that: 
Proof of Corollary 3
First, assume that{ > 2. Using Case II in Proposition 1 we have:
Also from Corollary 2 we have:
Assume that the quantities that …rm A puts in the segments{ 1 and{ 2 are y and x, respectively. Then, from equation (24), Corollary 1, and Corollary 2 we get the following system, which will characterize{:
y + x + 2x + 4x + ::: + 2{ 3 x = Q A (K { + 2)(x y) + x + 2x + 4x + :::
Letting H{ = 2{ 2 1 and K{ = K { + 2 we have:
K{y + (K{ + H{)x = Q B 0 < y x 2 Q A Q B .
Solving for x and y we have: 
Now, assume that{ = 2. Then, by Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 we have:
Note that H 2 = 0 and K{ = K. Hence, the system (26) This simply means that for any given
value, there will be one and only one corresponding set ( { ; { ]. This set identi…es the{ that gives the equilibrium. .
